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5Transformation of the Supplier System
Formulation of the Isolated-Type System
This chapter examines empirically how the isolated-type supplier system was estab-
lished in China’s motorcycle industry, using the framework presented in Chapter 1.
As a whole, this chapter provides examples of the assumption, presented in the
Introduction, that latecomers are likely to formulate isolated-type supplier systems
when minor-change competition among many homogeneous firms is continuously
launched in an immature market.
In the following three sections, the case of Jialing, firstly, demonstrates that in
China, large state-owned makers carrying the weight of expectations for the rapid
localization of imported technologies adopted united-type supplier systems starting
in the 1980s, which then changed to isolated-type systems as they rapidly pursued
mass production in the early 1990s. Then, the case of Qingqi shows that, due to the
lack of formal and informal institutions guaranteeing rules for market transactions,
opportunistic behaviors accelerated the formation of an isolated-type system of mal-
discipline. Finally, the case of Zongshen demonstrates, despite all this, that a new type
of maker emerged that pursued further development by establishing their own rules
and promoting well-disciplined cooperation with suppliers.
I. Why Was the “Complex” Dissolved? The Case of Jialing
In 1991, a policy was launched to establish a number of large-scale business groups
by consolidating related firms into a “national team.” Jialing was designated as one of
the fifty-five firms for the first-batch model case. One of the main goals the govern-
ment hoped to achieve from the “national teams” was that they would absorb the latest
technologies through import substitution, acquiring their own technologies and prod-
uct development capabilities, and eventually becoming business groups capable of
competing against global giants.1
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However, it was a difficult goal to accomplish, in view of the overwhelming strength
in technological, capital, and marketing capabilities held by dominant global firms at
the time. Even today, a few years past 2000, there are very few cases where firms even
in the NIEs, let alone among China’s “national teams,” have successfully caught up
with their counterparts in developed countries in various aspects (Amsden 2001,
Nolan and Jin 2002). Up until the first half of the 1990s, the difficulties were not
considered seriously by either the firms or the government. This was so because their
immediate goal was to localize imported vehicle models in a protected domestic
market and to satisfy the demand for these models through mass production. It was
not through international competition but rather through competition with new types
of firms in the domestic market in the middle of the 1990s that these difficulties were
seriously revealed.
The localization and mass production of motorcycles, involving a wide spectrum of
factor technologies, could hardly be achieved by Jialing alone, and needed to be
addressed in a united manner by a huge number of suppliers. One portion of the
supplier system it established in the 1980s, Jialing Motorcycle Economic Complex
(hereafter the “complex”), was a typical united-type system. However, in the early
1990s, the relationship was dissolved, and the system was transformed into an
isolated-type one.
This section, by analyzing the process of this transformation, examines the inherent
difficulties faced by Chinese firms in upgrading their technological capabilities through
united-type supplier systems.
1. Reverse Engineering and Honda’s Support for Mass Production
(1) Reverse Engineering in the Earliest Period: The CJ50
Jialing began producing motorcycles in 1979, by reverse engineering Honda’s two-
stroke 50 cc moped (PA50). Imported motorcycles were disassembled, and the parts
were measured to develop design drawings. Dies, molds, jigs, measuring instruments,
and specific processing equipment were produced in-house, with Jialing completing
prototype trials in five months (Zhang 1995, pp. 33–34). For parts that were difficult
to produce in-house, Jialing relied upon thirty-four outside factories specializing in
those spheres.2 The product was named the CJ50.
In the same year, the firm produced 55 units of the model and launched sales in
Beijing and Shanghai, attracting attention from propaganda organs, and subsequently
a rush of orders. In the following year, 2,500 units were produced, but this was far
from sufficient to meet the incoming orders. At first, Jialing had neither the technolo-
gies nor organization to implement full-fledged mass production. This could be in-
ferred from the fact that it quickly sought support from Honda. For the purpose of
examining its technological capability at that time, let us look at the content of the
technical cooperation arrangements acquired from Honda at that time (See Table 5-1).
(2) The Establishment of a Mass Production System with Honda’s Support
Toward the end of 1981, Jialing entered into a technical cooperation contract with
Honda for technological improvement of the CJ50 and for the establishment of a
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modern mass production system. Since it had no in-house testing equipment, Jialing
had Honda’s research institute in Japan evaluate its finished vehicle and important
parts of the CJ50, and from 1983, based on the outcome, it implemented technologi-
cal renovations on 146 items including the engine, driving system, and electrical
system, instituting brand-new standards in design, production technology, and quality
management. Starting in 1982, it purchased basic test equipment from Honda,3 while
gradually localizing important parts purchased from Honda. In 1988, all the parts
were finally localized (ZMGB 1995, pp. 66–67).4
With regard to the introduction of new models, the JH70 (based on the CD70) was
launched using the CKD (complete knock-down) method. At the same time, the
localization of its parts began methodically and 90 percent localization was attained
by 1989 (ZMGB 1995, pp. 66–67). The rapid formation of mass production capabil-
ity was pursued by introducing state-of-the-art equipment, and in 1986, an engine
factory was constructed. It was one of the largest in the world at that time, capable of
producing 600,000 units annually.5
According to a Honda employee in charge of negotiations with Jialing, in 1983,
when the contract was negotiated, Jialing had an annual production figure of only
100,000 or more units, but it initially asserted that it would build a factory capable of
processing engine parts for 1.2 million units. Honda recommended that it build a
factory capable of processing multi-model engines of a moderate size, closer to the
actual production level. Eventually, the parties agreed to build a factory with the
capacity to produce 600,000 units and capable of processing three types of engines.
Jialing, apparently showing little interest in the depreciation of investments and fore-
seeable equipment obsolescence resulting from technological changes, wanted to
“save as much production capability as possible.”6
TABLE 5-1
TECHNICAL COOPERATION CONTRACTS BETWEEN JIALING AND HONDA IN THE 1980S
First technical cooperation contract, 1981
1. Jialing purchased four parts including piston rings and valve springs, six pieces of motorcycle
measurement and testing equipment and two specialized precision processing machines from
Honda.
2. Honda provided support for the improvement of the CJ50 to a product of “international level.”
3. On the basis of the above, the two parties jointly developed new models suitable to China.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Second technical cooperation contract, 1983
1. Jialing purchased production technology of 70–145 cc class motorcycles from Honda, starting
with the JH70 (based on Honda’s CD70)
2. Honda provided support for Jialing’s construction of an engine production line (parts processing
and assembly) of 600,000 units per year. Jialing purchased 77 major pieces of equipment from
Honda.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Third technical cooperation contract, 1989
Honda provided support for Jialing’s development and production of 125cc models (based on Honda’s
XL125 with the CB125S engine).
Sources: ZMGB (1995), Zhang (1995), Yamaguchi (2005), and the author’s interviews with Jialing
and Honda.
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By the beginning of the 1990s, Jialing was making attempts to develop its own
models. These were minor-change models of the CJ50, and were received favorably
by the market.7 For the CJ50, it seems that the firm, having acquired a technological
level of proficiency through reverse engineering, was able to smoothly implement
minor changes chiefly by renovating the bodywork. Meanwhile, no development
project was undertaken for a totally new product, starting with the engine and other
major parts, and the firm was entirely dependent upon Honda for its brand-new
models.
Judging from the above, it is clear that Jialing, from the mid-1980s to the early
1990s, was paying as much attention as it could afford to pursuing a rapid expansion
of mass production capability for existing models, and that its own product develop-
ment capability remained underdeveloped.
2. Formation of the “Complex”
Jialing was able to sharply increase its production with the support of a supplier
system it organized independently. In 1980, it produced less than 3,000 units, and it
was concluded that a 17-million-yuan investment and three years would be necessary
to establish a system capable of producing 100,000 units (Zhang 1995, p. 39). How-
ever, Jialing by itself could not afford this either financially or technologically, and it
sought support from its suppliers.
(1) Composition of the “Complex”
In 1980, Jialing decided to establish a “complex”8 together with five suppliers who
all began manufacturing motorcycle parts for the first time. Five firms (two in engine
assembly, one for engine-parts casts, one for clutches, and one for wheels) were in
different administrative lines from Jialing and they participated in the “complex” as a
means to survive, as they were suffering from unfavorable business performance.9
The members of the “complex” increased from the initial five in 1980 to thirteen in
1990.10
Jialing purchased parts from as many as 250 or so suppliers in the early 1990s
(Zhang 1995, p. 190), and parts purchasing was not necessarily limited to the “com-
plex.” The functional difference between the members of the “complex” and other
suppliers was, according to an interview by the author, that the former were exem-
plary suppliers, who carried out the manufacturing and development of the most
important parts. Jialing used other suppliers11 for the sake of competition even for
parts produced by “complex” members. However, in the development of new prod-
ucts (i.e., localization), the members were given assignments on a preferential basis
and usually received a higher share of orders from Jialing even after the launching of
mass production.
(2) Cooperative Activities of the “Complex”: Risk Sharing and Capability Nurturing
The transaction relationship within the “complex” can be characterized by “goal
cost management,” “second distribution of profits,” and a “reserve fund.” Firstly, in
view of the market conditions, a goal cost for the motorcycle to be developed was
determined. Next, based on the goal cost as well as the technologies and raw materials
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of each firm, the prices of the parts were determined. All profits obtained by the
rationalization efforts of an individual firm were returned to it, while any losses were
also borne by it (“goal cost management”). The total profits earned by Jialing after
sales were redistributed pro rata to each firm in accordance with costs (second distri-
bution of profits). Further, a certain percentage of the profits for second distribution
(10 percent when the “complex” began) was allocated as a “reserve fund” to be loaned
at low interest rates when a cash-strapped member needed to make investments into
equipment for technological upgrading. As of 1990, the reserve fund amounted to
over 3 million yuan, of which more than 2 million yuan was on loan to eight member
firms (ZMGB 1955, pp. 71–72).
These successive transactions with fixed members continued for over ten years. Let
us now consider what necessitated the establishment of such a system and why it
could be maintained.
For Jialing, the most significant purpose for establishing the “complex” was to
develop mass production capability, and the role of the members was to jointly bear
the investment costs. In this sense, the “complex” had a powerful effect.12
The fixed relationship within the “complex” seems to have enabled Jialing to
nurture the capabilities required of suppliers. The assignments given to the members
were to localize parts imported chiefly from Honda using the CKD method. Many of
the members initially lacked design capability, and their most important goal was to
learn to manufacture precisely in accordance with the drawings supplied by Jialing.
According to the firms surveyed, nurturing could not be achieved without a somewhat
fixed relationship. At the time, many suppliers wanted to join the “complex,” but it
was extremely difficult due to the strict entry criteria. They were attracted by the
stable orders from Jialing and the opportunities for development.13
To draw forth the commitment of the members, Jialing undertook all or some part
of the transaction-specific investment of suppliers, provided financial support to troubled
firms, and gave technological support. This constituted the payment of the cost of
providing insurance and nurturing (“supplier development”), as we saw in Chapter 1.
Initially, many of the “complex” members were stagnant and money-losing firms,
and Jialing extended financial support to them when they joined.14
With regard to the provision of insurance, the following example was cited (Zhang
1995, pp. 41–43): In the beginning of 1983, at a meeting of the “complex” to decide
on the purchase prices of parts, one money-losing clutch supplier demanded a three-
yuan increase of the unit price for clutches. The goal cost for the product as a whole
had already been determined, so the other suppliers cried foul, as a higher price for
clutches would necessarily lead to lower prices for other parts. The meeting erupted
into turmoil, and Jialing, fearing the disintegration of the “complex,” raised the
purchase price for clutches, but agreed to bear two-thirds of the cost for the price hike
by itself, and to have the remaining third offset by a reduction in purchasing prices
from other suppliers. This indicates that Jialing redistributed the risks among suppli-
ers, and occasionally absorbed risks itself.
Furthermore, Jialing gave priority to the members in the allocation of new product
development projects, and provided them with technological guidance by dispatching
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engineers. However, it was also in the process of learning technology from Honda,
and it did not necessarily have a technological advantage vis-à-vis suppliers. It sup-
plied drawings, work/quality standards, and production management know-how it
had acquired from Honda. Honda also provided direct technical guidance to a portion
of its important suppliers.
On the other hand, it restricted the activities of its suppliers. It demanded that
suppliers deliver 100 percent of their products to it, and if parts were sold to rival
makers, it threatened suppliers with possible expulsion from the “complex.”15 It did
not want the parts produced using Honda’s drawings to be exploited by rival makers,
and suppliers had no choice but to obey because of the oligopolistic order volume of
the firm at that time.
3. Dissolution of the “Complex”: Disappearance of Mutual Merits
The “complex” was disbanded around 1993. Around that time, Jialing discontin-
ued its “goal cost management,” replacing it with a competitive bidding system, and
it abolished the second distribution of profits among the members. Along with this,
it began diversifying its suppliers, who, at the same time, increased their sales to
other makers. In other words, the transaction organization changed in nature from a
united-type one to something closer to an isolated-type one. It appears that the fixed
relationship of the “complex” stopped generating rent for both Jialing and the mem-
bers. Let us look at how this occurred, in view of the framework examined in Chap-
ter 1.
(1) The Disappearance of Suppliers’ Merits: Diminishing “Effect of Commitment
Acquisition”
The disbandment of the “complex” was partly caused by the diminished “effect of
commitment acquisition” for the suppliers. This is exemplified by the sale of engines
produced by firm h, which is said to have been an important trigger for the disband-
ment of the “complex.”
In the latter half of the 1980s, the makers, based on bullish business forecasts,
introduced massive amounts of new equipment, but in reality the demand turned out
to be so weak that sales in the beginning of the 1990s were lower than the 1985 level.16
Given this situation, they began to experience surplus production capability. In par-
ticular, orders to the three engine suppliers producing 50 cc engines stopped growing,
as Jialing focused on the 70 cc engine as a main product, and began in-house produc-
tion in the maker’s newly built state-of-the-art factory. In other words, for suppliers,
“profits from transactions” with Jialing declined.
In 1988, engine supplier h, one of the three suppliers and a large-sized maker of
military communication devices, used its engineering capability to develop a 90 cc
engine, applying minor changes to the JH70 engine. It proposed that Jialing develop a
new model using the engine it had produced, but the plan was not adopted by the
maker, which instead began to keep a close eye on the supplier to make sure it was not
carrying out transactions with other makers.17 Supplier h clearly had too much capa-
bility, both in terms of mass production and development.
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About this time, new makers began carrying out minor changes on the JH70 in the
coastal region, and the number of officially registered makers increased from twenty-
two in 1980 to ninety in 1988. With the increased “substitutability of transaction
partners,” supplier h, around 1993, began selling its 90 cc engine to these new makers.
Minor change competition began around this time throughout China.
In addition to h, other suppliers that were bound by Jialing but equipped with
product development capabilities began to carry out transactions with new makers by
the mid-1990s. The industry as a whole was reaping soaring profits and the second
distribution of profits provided by Jialing was no longer attractive. Jialing’s invest-
ment into nurturing was limited. Its support for capability upgrading did not go
beyond such capabilities as producing parts exactly as specified in drawings, and no
arrangements were made for the suppliers after the model became obsolete.
(2) Disappearance of the Merit for Jialing: Decrease of the “Effect of Rent Acquisi-
tion”
The “effect of rent acquisition” for Jialing also decreased. According to the suppli-
ers, the disbandment of the “complex” was due to the fact that Jialing increased its
purchases of parts from other suppliers than “complex” members in expanding its
production volume, and the members, by selling their products to Jialing alone, were
no longer able to fill their production capability. Rather than giving priority to the
members, Jialing began substituting transactions with other suppliers.
The biggest reason for this was that many suppliers had grown in and around
Chongqing. In that area, large state-owned makers such as Jianshe and Wangjiang
Machinery Manufacturing Works also nurtured publicly owned suppliers of their own
during the 1980s, and in the first half of the 1990s, a large number of privately owned
suppliers began to emerge (See Section III of this chapter).
Given these circumstances, some of the members of the “complex” suffered from a
relative decline in performance. For example, in the first half of the 1980s, in Chongqing,
only a limited number of large-sized state-owned firms possessed technology and
equipment for aluminum die casting and mold manufacturing, and firm g, which
belonged to the ordnance industry line, was in charge of these parts in the “complex.”
In the 1990s, however, private suppliers began to enter the market, purchasing molds
from private mold manufacturers rising in the coastal region. Meanwhile, supplier g
failed to achieve corporate reform in a timely fashion, and consequently lost the
ability to meet Jialing’s demands.18 Compared with new suppliers, the “capability
upgrading potential” of the existing suppliers declined in relative terms.
What was more significant was the impetus for Jialing to quickly expand the
production scale of its existing models to deal with the rapid expansion of the market.
Consequently, it adopted a purchasing policy to conduct quality management by
driving many suppliers to compete against each other, thereby imposing pressure on
them. The capability of mass production and quality control for existing parts de-
manded from suppliers was no longer worth the cost of nurturing suppliers in the first
half of the 1990s. These are capabilities that are highly likely to be exploited by
competitors and it is conceivable that the “effect of rent acquisition” generated by
90 CHAPTER 5
supplier nurturing costs declined for Jialing in the 1990s, when it was not active in
new model development.
4. Difficulties Involved in Exploiting the United-Type System
The cases described above demonstrate the difficulties that firms with poor firm-
specific competitive advantage (in this case, technological knowledge for product
differentiation) face in exploiting and maintaining a united-type system in the midst
of fierce price competition among many homogeneous rivals. In the 1980s, state-
owned makers clearly had a relative advantage, since they were protected from for-
eign makers by government policy, and because private firms not yet developed. The
united-type system was effective in the phase when makers were in a powerful
position vis-à-vis suppliers. However, what Jialing nurtured, based upon this, was the
capability to manufacture parts exactly as specified in drawings, and mass production
capability. The technological capability of the maker and its suppliers had not reached
the level where they could exploit firm-to-firm cooperative activities for more qualita-
tive product differentiation.
In the 1990s, as a result of the massive new entries and the burgeoning low-end
market, which may be described as Chinese characteristics, full-fledged minor change
competition was launched in the industry across the board. Jialing, whose position
declined in relative terms vis-à-vis both suppliers and private makers, neither had any
need nor the ability to maintain a united-type system in pursuing the rapid expansion
of production scale, and the system changed into an isolated-type one. As far as
Jialing is concerned, the policy to nurture a “national team” equipped with proprietary
technological and product development capabilities through close interfirm coopera-
tion existed only in name.
Jialing reduced its production sharply from 1997, putting the mass production-
oriented transaction relationship into turmoil. Hasty expansion had brought quality
problems, and the maker began to seek to reform the transaction system by discon-
tinuing transactions in 1998 with over seventy suppliers, with whom it had main-
tained long-term relationships.19
In the preceding chapter, the author described Jialing’s supplier system as an
isolated-type, mal-disciplined one, which may have characteristic of a transition
period after the united-type system dissolved and before the new system became
stable.
II. The Mal-disciplined Transaction Relationship as a Result of Risk
Shifting: The Case of Qingqi
In Chapter 4, I have described the situation in the second half of the 1990s, where mal-
disciplined transaction rules and opportunism were rampant, but this is not necessar-
ily characteristic of an isolated-type system. The author considers this to be a fluid
situation that emerged in the transition economy, as a result of the immaturity of
various institutions supporting smooth market transactions, and from opportunistic
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behaviors taking advantage of this immaturity. The author sees this as a phenomenon
where a decline of “transaction credibility” caused a reduction in the commitment of
suppliers, in turn facilitating the supply of compatible parts in the market and increas-
ing the “substitutability of transaction partners,” and driving the system to be increas-
ingly isolated. As a typical case, Qingqi’s supplier system is examined in this section.
1. Difficulties Caused by the Policy for Excessive Expansion
From 1997 to 1999, Qingqi was China’s top maker in terms of the number of units
producing, outperforming Jialing. In 1999, it was one of the thirteen “excellent firms”
designated for the second batch of “technological innovation pilot enterprises”20 from
throughout the country. In 2000, however, its business performance plunged (Chapter
2, Figure 2-5). This happened because several problems that had been hidden in the
second half of the 1990s came to the fore.
(1) Qingqi’s Weakness, and Fund-Raising Utilizing a Cosmetic Image
Qingqi, the oldest motorcycle maker in China, came to the brink of bankruptcy in
the mid-1980s, when its conventional models held over from the planned economy
era became obsolete in the market. In 1986, it received technological support from
Suzuki and launched the CKD production of 50 cc scooters, which put it into a growth
orbit. It followed the same path as Jialing, in that it introduced design drawings and
production equipment from Suzuki, and pursued the localization of major parts (ZMGB
1995, pp. 78–80; Interview with Qingqi). What was different was that Qingqi intro-
duced a small two-stroke engine scooter.21
Qingqi, along with Jialing, achieved a rapid expansion of production in the first half
of the 1990s, but its major products were small scooters designed for urban areas and
its market was concentrated in Shandong Province, particularly Jinan City, where it is
located (ZQGNB, various years; interview with Qingqi). Province-wise, Shandong is
China’s biggest motorcycle market, and Qingqi, by dominating that market, gained an
advantage over its rivals. However, in the mid-1990s, the shift to four-stroke engines
became clear in the entire market, and in the meantime, regulations against new
purchases of motorcycles were gradually implemented in big cities. For Qingqi, the
model shift and the cultivation of markets outside Shandong became pressing prob-
lems.
In hindsight, Qingqi failed to overcome this challenge. Its newly released four-
stroke 125 cc model, produced with the support of Suzuki, did not sell well due to its
high price, and sales plunged as the full-fledged application of the regulations against
new purchases in big cities took effect. In 2001, the number of sales dropped to less
than half of the level two years earlier.
The unfavorable sales performance was also to a significant degree due to the
deterioration of the firm’s ability to find financing in the market, as a result of
revelations of its hidden cumulative debt. It was revealed that Qingqi Group had
engaged in “improper” financing using Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co., Ltd. (hereafter,
Jinan Qingqi), one of its subsidiaries and a listed company, and that its investment had
failed.22
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Jinan Qingqi, the core production base of the Qingqi Group, may be adequately
described as a “factory,” since it essentially had no independent managerial authority,
as its parts and materials were purchased through Qingqi’s purchasing department
and its sales were conducted through Qingqi’s sales department. Partly because Qingqi
became the industry leader in terms of production quantity in the middle of the 1990s,
Jinan Qingqi’s share price was favorable. The parent firm then had Jinan Qingqi issue
new stocks, and used the money raised to make strategic group investments. The
money was absorbed by Qingqi (the sales department) in the form of nonpayments for
motorcycles owed to Jinan Qingqi. These nonpayments came to more than 2 billion
yuan (about U.S.$240 million) in 2000, while the sales of Jinan Qingqi of the same
year were just 530 million yuan.
(2) The Formation of an Enterprise Group and Making Suppliers into Subsidiaries
Qingqi, as an enterprise group, actively retained joint-venture affiliates under its
control in the motorcycle industry, maintaining over seventy productive affiliated
firms domestically as of 1998.23 The challenges Qingqi faced in the 1990s, namely the
model shift and the expansion of sales channels into regions outside Shandong, were
quickly overcome by buying out existing firms and setting up joint venture firms with
others. A portion of the funds Qingqi raised from the market through Jinan Qingqi
were presumably used for those buyouts.
By 1998, the firm had established eleven finished vehicle assembly makers outside
Shandong Province. In 1998, it inaugurated a four-stroke engine factory as a joint
venture (firm O) with a privately owned firm (See Note 7 of Chapter 4).
At the same time, it established new parts-manufacturing firms and transformed
existing suppliers into subsidiaries (Table 5-2). The purpose of this, according to an
interview with Qingqi in 1998, was to strengthen the supplier’s quality control and
TABLE 5-2
AFFILIATED SUPPLIERS OF THE QINGQI GROUP IN THE 1990S
1993 S1 [firm m] (D, harnesses and other electric parts)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1994 S2 (D, equipment and tooling), S3 (F, electric parts), S4 (F, n.a.), S5 (F, n.a), S6 (F, tooling)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1995 S7 (F, plastic injection parts), S8 (F, engine-related electric parts)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1996 S9 [firm p] (T, crankshafts), S10 (F, oil pumps), S11 (F, electric starters), S12 (F, molds and
dies)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1997 S13 [firm n] (T, pistons), S14 (T, standard parts)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1998 S15 (T, cylinders), S16 (T, shock absorbers), S17 (T, meter), S18 (F, clutches)
Source: The author’s interview with Qingqi.
Notes: 1. S1–S18 are the anonyms of Qingqi’s supplier firms. S1, S9, and S13 are firm m, p, and n
respectively in our survey for this study.
2. Information in parentheses shows the firms’ ownership and main products. Their owner-
ship is presented with D, T, and F, signifying D: joint-venture firms between Qingqi and
a domestic firm (domestic JV), T: state-owned firms, which belonged to different admin-
istrative control lines before, whose management rights were transferred to Qingqi, and
F: firms capitally affiliated with foreign firms (foreign JV).
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absorb (internalize) parts technology. By carrying out direct management integration
through equity participation, Qingqi may have hoped to enhance the commitment of
suppliers and promote their capability upgrading. Equity participation involves an
investment risk, but it is a powerful tool for building a close transaction relationship
under the leadership of the maker.
2. Risk-Shifting Activities and the Decline of Supplier Commitment
(1) Mal-disciplined and Opportunistic Transactions
In reality, however, Qingqi failed to acquire commitment from the affiliated suppli-
ers. Moral hazard on its part was the main reason.
After Qingqi made its suppliers into subsidiaries, it used them as sales outlets rather
than concentrating on upgrading their capabilities, and this imposed a heavy burden
upon them. This became clear around 1997, when Qingqi rushed to rapidly expand its
production, whereas sales stopped growing and the stock began to balloon.
Firms n and p, which became subsidiaries in the second half of the 1990s, estab-
lished motorcycle sales shops together with Qingqi. Qingqi provided motorcycles to
be sold, management know-how, and advertising, while n and p supplied staff, land,
and buildings. As payment for the parts purchased from the two suppliers, Qingqi sent
them motorcycles to sell in the sales shops. The price of the motorcycle established
for this barter exchange was allegedly higher than the market price. As of 1998, the
two suppliers had received only 20 percent of the proceeds of the parts in currency.
Through this, Qingqi was able to save on operating capital.
The situation of firm m, an affiliated joint-venture supplier that rejected the joint
management of a sales shop on the ground that it was too costly, was in reality the
same as that of the two firms listed above. From 1995 to 2001, more than 70 percent of
the proceeds for its parts were paid in kind with motorcycles. The motorcycles were
delivered to a sales shop designated unilaterally by Qingqi, and firm m received
payments for its parts from the sales shop when motorcycles were sold. It had to
collect the payment directly from the sales shop, which in fact never made payments
without much resistance.
Rampant unpaid fees and coerced payment in kind accompanied by the establish-
ment of sales shops seem to have been aggravated by the lack of a judiciary system
able to regulate unfair transactions in business society as a whole.
(2) Minor-Change Competition Facilitated by Subsidiary Suppliers
In 1997, Qingqi had firm n invest 13 million yuan into NC machining equipment to
process pistons for a new model 125 cc four-stroke engine (GS125-type). The firm
initially declined, saying that it couldn’t afford it, but changed its mind and decided to
make the investment because the local county government and Qingqi promised to
offer collateral for two thirds of the investment. Under the initial plan, Qingqi was
supposed to give priority to firm n in purchasing parts as an effort to expedite the
depreciation of the investment. However, it turned out that Qingqi’s 125 cc model did
not sell, and supplier n had no way to depreciate the investment. The supplier was
obliged to provide parts to maker N, which launched a minor-change version of the
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same GS125 with the parts. Later, maker N, mainly by launching minor-change
versions of the models made by Qingqi and Jinan Qingqi Suzuki Motorcycle Co., Ltd.
(a joint-venture maker between Suzuki and Qingqi) at a low price, had great success,
thus taking the top spot in terms of units produced in China in 2000. By demanding
that its subsidiary make an unaffordable investment, Qingqi ended up indirectly
supporting a competitor. This is a commonly observed trend with Qingqi’s suppliers,
and is not a special case for supplier n (other examples are l, m, and p).
Qingqi itself encouraged the sales to its competitors. Until the mid-1990s, when it
enjoyed favorable business results, it imposed restrictions on the clients of its affiliated
suppliers, just like Jialing.24 However, as sales stagnated, it began to actively recom-
mend that its affiliated suppliers sell parts to competitors. The maker, as an investor,
gave priority to the affiliates’ business performance.
(3) Imperfections in the Chinese Market and Mal-disciplined Transactions
In the second survey, a manager of firm m said, “It was as if we had no partnership
with Qingqi. We worked together for seven years but the partnership ended in failure.
When the business was good, we had a relationship of trust but when business went
bad, it disappeared.” Since 2000, when the substance of Qingqi’s debt was revealed,
the suppliers rapidly disengaged themselves from the maker, supplying their products
only on the basis of advance payments.
Until that time, however, its image as the industry’s No. 1 maker was sufficient to
lead the subsidiaries and other affiliated suppliers to accept, though reluctantly, the
relationship. In this sense, the lack of transparency regarding corporate information in
the stock market and other public trading institutions had no small influence. Suppli-
ers were thereby forced to foot part of the bill for Qingqi’s huge investment.
There were distinct “market imperfections” conducive to rampant moral hazard in
China in the 1990s, when the country was undergoing a transition of its economic
system. In the case dealt with in this section, it involved a lack (or manipulation) of
corporate information represented by the absence of transparency in the stock market
and the lack of a judiciary system to prevent unfair transactions. Given these circum-
stances, the maker, using opportunistic behaviors, drove the suppliers away from
itself. Further, by encouraging them to supply the same types of parts to competitors,
it helped to accelerate minor-change competition in the entire market, thus weakening
its own position. This was one of the significant backgrounds behind the emergence of
the isolated-type system of mal-discipline.
III. Building Trust with Suppliers: Zongshen
In a competitive environment where the various institutions that support the market
mechanism are immature, interfirm transaction relationships do not necessarily be-
come fluid and mal-disciplined. Rather, for this very reason, firms may emerge that
establish their own rules among an exclusive group and act with discipline. A typical
example of this is the supplier system of Zongshen. Although, as we examined in the
preceding chapter, its system in the latter half of the 1990s was relatively close to an
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isolated-type one compared with that in Japan, it also incorporated important ele-
ments of a united-type system in that it emphasized disciplined transactions and
pursued the upgrading of its products jointly with suppliers.25
Zongshen, which launched its business as a “pick-up parts assembler,” found the
source for its development into a major maker in the consolidation of “transaction
credibility” with its suppliers. Because it had very little firm-specific technological
advantage and was obliged to depend upon purchases, acquiring the commitment of
suppliers became key. This section examines how it developed its supplier system
toward a more united-type one as a higher quality level came to be demanded of
motorcycles during the 1990s.
1. The Foundation of Zongshen: Beginning from the “Pick-up Assembly” of
Existing Parts
(1) Engine Business with the “Pick-up Assembly” of Parts
In 1990, Zuo Zongshen, who ran a motorcycle repair shop in Chongqing, began to
assemble and sell engines. As we saw in Section I in the case of firm h, Zuo’s move
took place in the context of a production surplus of engine parts suppliers in Chongqing
and the emergence of new makers (engine users) nationwide.
Engine assemblers such as Zongshen began their businesses by assembling exist-
ing parts purchased through the OEM supplier networks of state-owned makers or
independent suppliers of repair parts. It is not clear how Zuo initiated the business.
Let us, therefore, look into the case of Yin Mingshan, the founder of Lifan, who
launched an engine assembly firm in Chongqing in 1992, following Zongshen.
Yin, who had become a bookseller after teaching English and performing other
jobs, heard that a motorcycle assembly factory run by a school in Chongqing was
looking for engines. He secretly purchased sets of repair parts from the service
department of Jianshe and assembled them as they were, selling the products to the
factory.26 The sales price of an OEM engine at the time was 1,998 yuan, vis-à-vis
1,400 yuan for the cost of a complete set of repair parts for the same engine. Jianshe,
when it noticed what was happening, stopped selling repair parts to Yin, but by then
he had already cultivated another channel for purchasing parts (Tian and Xun 2001,
pp. 501–2).27 He disassembled an existing engine and began having suppliers produce
the same parts.
Zongshen seems to have developed in a similar manner. Zuo described this method
as “dismounting (chai) and mounting (zhuang),” and linking this with the manage-
ment of the operating cash flow, he said, “300 suppliers are 300 banks.” (ZDB 2002,
pp. 7–8) As was examined in Chapter 4, payments for the assembled parts were only
made after the engine was sold. Zongshen and other makers came into being one after
another and rapidly developed by exploiting the rise of suppliers.
In October 1992, Zuo officially inaugurated Chongqing Zongshen Motorcycle
Science and Technology Development Co., Ltd. (the core firm of the present Zongshen
Group). Up until that time, it was an individual small business that was treated as
equivalent to an “illegal factory,” which had been subject to clampdowns by the
Chongqing municipal government. However, following the turnaround in the ideo-
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logical situation triggered by Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Lectures early the same
year, the firm came onto the front stage as a legitimate maker.
(2) Rapid Increase of Privately Owned Parts Suppliers
Many privately owned parts suppliers were established in the first half of the 1990s.
Attracted by the high profits of the “era of excessive profits” as the parties longingly
remember, it was possible, by laying down a sizable amount of money and recruiting
key personnel from state-owned firms, to begin production within a very short period
TABLE 5-3
CAREERS OF FOUNDERS AND KEY ENGINEERS OF CHONGQING’S PRIVATELY OWNED
MOTORCYCLE MAKERS AND SUPPLIERS
Name of Year Founder’s Prior Career Top Key Engineers Previouslythe Firm Founded Employed by:
1. Maker
Zongshen 1989 Individual (MC repairing) State (MC maker)
Lifan 1992 School teacher, editor, individual State (MC engines)
(bookselling)
Loncin 1993 Individual (building material sales) State (MC engines)
R 1990 State (Jialing, shop-floor work) Foreign (MC maker)
individual (sales)
Q 1992 State (Jianshe, management) State (chemical machinery)
S 1993 Individual (MC parts sales) State (machine tools)
M 1994 State (gear processing, shop-floor State (MC maker)
processing)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Suppliers
k 1982 Collective (metal sundries, management) k (the same firm)
i 1983 State (special steel, sales) State (chemical equipment)
x 1984 Village (sundries, management) State (engines)
q 1986 Village (springs, management) State (machinery)
b 1988 State (NC systems, engineering) State (measurement equipment)
w 1991 State (shop-floor work), individual (MC State (machinery)
parts sales)
r 1992 Individual (MC parts sales) State (MC maker)
al 1993 Individual (building materials sales) State (machinery)
v 1994 Individual (steel materials sales) State (welding)
s 1994 Individual (auto parts sales) State (glass)
u 1994 State (distribution, sales) State (armaments)
t 1997 State (medical equipment, management) State (gear processing)
Source: Survey by the author.
Notes: 1. The symbols for the names of the firms are the same as in Appendix Table.
2. Former firms that founders and top engineers belonged to: individual = individually run
businesses, state = state-owned firms, collective = collectively owned firms, village =
village-run firms, foreign = foreign JV firms;
3. ( ): Business sphere of the former firm and specialized sphere within the former firm.
MC stands for motorcycle.
4. The founders originally from individual businesses were all top manager of their respec-
tive firms. The top engineer is the person in charge of technologies in the firm, usually in
the position of general engineer or factory director. Top engineers were all engineers and
technical staff in their former firms.
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of time. With the expertise of the engineers of state-owned firms, who were well
versed in technologies, making motorcycle parts was easy.28 The founders of privately
owned parts suppliers in Chongqing who were surveyed for this study had expertise
predominantly in sales and management from their early careers, and all of their top
engineers worked as engineers or technical personnel in public firms (Table 5-3).
The development of privately owned new suppliers was crucial for engine makers
such as Zongshen and Lifan. Existing suppliers nurtured by Jialing and other state-
owned makers tended to be controlled by those makers, and their parts production
capabilities alone were not adequate to respond to the rapid increase of demand in the
first half of the 1990s. The exact number of privately owned suppliers operating in
Chongqing City is not known, but according to Zuo, as of 1998, Zongshen was using
about 500 suppliers, 90 percent of which were located within the city. Of them, 60
percent were privately owned suppliers, who “grew together from scratch.”
(3) Embarking on Finished Vehicle Production: From Cost to Quality
Zongshen grew by selling engines to makers in the coastal region (Figure 5-1). As
of 1998, rural areas accounted for about 70 percent of the final destinations of its
engines, minor urban areas such as county cities and townships for 15–20 percent,
and exports for 5–10 percent.29 It achieved success by adopting a low-price strategy to
respond to the rural demand.
Meanwhile, it began producing finished motorcycles in 1995, initially through
OEM production of other maker’s brands. In 1998, it launched production of finished
vehicles under its own brand.

































Fig. 5-1. Engine Production by Chongqing’s Three Privately Owned Makers
Source: ZQGNB (various years) and the author’s interviews
with the makers.
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Zongshen was more conscious of quality than quantity and cost. As stated earlier, its
product range was narrow and it focused on a few hot-selling “base model” vehicles.
These were low-price products, but Zongshen, by upgrading the quality, tried to
differentiate itself from competitors.
As of the first survey, Zongshen’s outsourcing ratio was about 90 percent,30 indicat-
ing very heavy dependency on suppliers. It is a typical maker, which, despite having
only an extremely narrow scope of its own technologies, has developed by offsetting
this disadvantage through heavy utilization of external resources. The key to upgrad-
ing the production quality of finished vehicles under its own brand was to draw forth
a commitment from suppliers, make cooperative efforts, and implement careful mu-
tual adjustments among parts in minor-change-type development. The device en-
abling this was the following transaction system.
2. Supplier System Based on Trust
At the end of 1998, Zongshen formed the Zongshen Group together with 66 of its
major suppliers. The group consisted of 11 capital-controlled subsidiaries (the “core
layer,” hexin-ceng), 23 suppliers with no capital affiliation but whose most important
business partner was Zongshen (“close-layer,” jinmi-ceng) and 43 suppliers of sec-
ondary importance (“semi-close layer,” ban-jinmi-ceng) (Zongshen chanye bao
[Zongshen industry news], Nov. 26, 1998). Of firms q through z, which were surveyed
for this study, nine firms, with the exception of u, belong to the “close-layer.” In the
following, I will examine, based on the findings of the first survey, the transaction
system formulated by Zongshen and its suppliers in the second half of the 1990s.
(1) Emphasis on Trust and Discipline
Zongshen, with a view to promoting competition, implemented the multisourcing
of parts, but the membership was stable and the purchase price was set so that a
certain level of profit31 could be secured. Important suppliers were treated preferen-
tially and given a chance to perform new product development.
In terms of risk management, though transaction-specific investments, for dies and
molds, for example, were in principal borne by suppliers, the maker refrained from
conducting multisourcing in the development phase, and multisourcing was seldom
implemented before the depreciation of the dies and molds was completed. The
transaction was not completely free from uncollected payments, but the maker gave
priority in making payments to the important suppliers. A deposit system was also
introduced to prevent dubious uncollected payments.32
Zongshen provided little direct support to suppliers such as long-term personnel
exchanges or technological guidance for the sake of upgrading their capability. How-
ever, it did extend some financial support to certain suppliers by supplying dies and
molds and/or giving them priority in payments at the time of their foundation or
introduction of new equipment.33
An important element of its system of cooperative business was the cooperative
quality management method under the “quality assurance system” introduced in
1997. The system was run as follows.
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Once a year, a delivery contract was signed between Zongshen and each supplier,
and on this occasion, a “quality assurance contract” was concluded after the two
parties went through discussions on technology and exchanged a “guarantee
certificate”34 mainly concerning prompt response and compensation in the event of
problems. Each member of Zongshen’s technical staff was assigned to cover a few
suppliers, and was assigned to make regular visits to those suppliers. Referring to the
“operation standard” jointly developed by Zongshen and the supplier, the staff mem-
ber carried out on-site checks to ensure that operations were being carried out exactly
as it specified. At the same time, he or she provided information about the new
technologies for products and equipment and about other suppliers.
Zongshen, with a strong awareness of the need to strengthen its ability to make
inspections and measurements for quality upgrading, demanded that suppliers intro-
duce testing equipment. All the suppliers surveyed shared the awareness that quality
upgrading was the key to competitive strength.
(2) Suppliers’ Evaluations of Zongshen
Suppliers had a high opinion of the system operated by Zongshen. In particular, the
maker was highly appreciated compared to state-owned makers such as Jialing in that
it offered good prices, did not impose unreasonable burden on suppliers, and imple-
mented strict quality control.
Zongshen said that the owner himself, as the person with ultimate responsibility,
made the final decision to purchase important parts. This apparently eliminated op-
portunistic behaviors and corruption among the personnel in charge and other unrea-
sonable responses frequently observed in state-owned firms, leading to flexible deci-
sion-making on transaction terms by a simple phone call.
Zongshen, like other makers, had nonpayments, but its suppliers believed that these
were relatively small and that its orders were large enough to offset the balance. They
recognized themselves as major suppliers of the firm, and believed they were given
relatively favorable treatment in receiving payments.
Importantly, each supplier perceived those uncollected payments as being equiva-
lent to an “interest-free loan” to Zongshen, a kind of support for the maker. Their
shared feeling was that as Zongshen was also taking great risks in doing business, and
that its major suppliers could not avoid sharing some of the risk.
More importantly, each supplier recognized that it could “improve its ability by
complying with Zongshen’s quality demands, which are quite severe.”35
The suppliers recognized that quality upgrading was the only way to ensure sur-
vival, and sought to upgrade themselves in unison with Zongshen. The trust of suppli-
ers toward Zongshen and their commitment to the system operated by the maker may
also have increased the rent between themselves.
(3) Limited Commitment
However, the suppliers’ commitment to Zongshen was limited. For instance, Zuo,
at the time of the survey, told the author that the close-layer suppliers’ obligation
toward his company was to give top priority to its orders and respond to requests from
development projects. However, most of the suppliers considered these requests to be
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targets rather than obligations. As we saw in Section II of the preceding chapter,
Zongshen’s share in their transaction volume was not overwhelming and suppliers
had no intention to sacrifice other business opportunities. Rather, they projected that
Zongshen’s rapid growth in sales would eventually decelerate, and realized the need
to diversify their risk. For instance, Lifan and Loncin followed Zongshen’s lead,
forming similar groups, and three (q, t, and v) of Zongshen’s five “close-layer”
suppliers interviewed by the author in the first survey were also included among the
“close layer” suppliers of Lifan and Loncin’s groups at the same time.36 The suppliers
maintained their independence and participated in the system selectively, while con-
ducting risk management on their own. This was different from the perception of
“sharing a destiny” and “open commitment”37 as is often seen in Japan.
3. Effect of Commitment and Rent Acquisition Increased by Trust
The supplier system run by Zongshen, compared with that of the two Japanese
makers, seemed relatively close to an isolated-type one because of the limited nature
of the mutual commitment. However, the transaction system was disciplined. Zongshen,
along with its major suppliers, established a concrete and detailed system of competi-
tion and appraisal, managing it based on rules and promises. The suppliers, with the
recognition that trust in the discipline and cooperation with Zongshen would lead to
mutual upgrading, were engaged in a “quality assurance system” and other coopera-
tive activities, while taking risks themselves. In other words, Zongshen was success-
ful in deliberately acquiring a commitment from suppliers through confidence build-
ing, and this created rents for both sides as the competitiveness of the entire system
was enhanced through the expense of the nurturing cost. Zongshen’s system involved,
to a large extent, significant elements of a united-type one.
One conceivable reason for the limited commitment of suppliers to Zongshen is
that their transaction volume with it was not sufficient to fill their capacity. This was
solely due to the fact that the competition pattern of Zongshen was of minor change
type, depending heavily on common suppliers and invited engineers with homoge-
neous technologies, and therefore having a very small leeway for the addition of
proprietary values. As such, the maker always faced the need to compete fiercely with
other homogeneous competitors such as Lifan and Loncin, sharing the market with
them.
IV. Summary
This chapter empirically analyzed how the isolated-type supplier system was formed
and changed in China in the 1990s.
In the case of Jialing, it was found that the system spontaneously changed to an
isolated-type one, as the “manufacturing capability” for localization nurtured by the
united-type system became obsolete in the midst of the massive entry of private
suppliers and as the maker responded to the unprecedented rise of the domestic
market by pursuing a rapid expansion of production volume. At the time when the
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competition pattern changed from one of “localization competition” to “mass produc-
tion competition of existing models,” Jialing lacked a clear-cut strategy for pulling its
suppliers and accumulating new qualitative competitiveness (e.g., new product devel-
opment capability) within the system. It was lacking in such technologies as well as
the leadership of strategic concepts that made it possible.
In the case of Qingqi, it was shown that the maker alienated its suppliers through
unilateral opportunistic behaviors and by allowing them to supply homogeneous parts
to competitors, promoted minor change competition, further endangering its own
position. The problem was a lack of various institutions to guarantee market transac-
tions, allowing rampant opportunism by state-owned firms. It seems to have been a
mal-disciplined fluid situation that appeared within the transition to the market economy
system.
In the case of Zongshen, the maker, by emphasizing trust and abiding by discipline
among privately owned firms, drew forth an appreciable commitment from suppliers,
which was linked to capability upgrading for quality improvement. However, the
maker, having only limited proprietary technological knowledge and continuing mi-
nor change competition, had yet to reach a higher level of commitment.
As a whole, the above three case studies have, the author believes, adequately
demonstrated the validity of the assumption presented in Chapter 1, that it is likely
that makers in late-industrializing economies, in the competitive low-end market
characterized by immature transactions rules and continuous price competition among
many homogeneous firms, will formulate isolated-type supplier systems. With poor
proprietary resources for differentiation and weak leadership, makers are unable to
draw forth commitment from suppliers who gained strength in an isolated manner and
continue to acquire rent through united-type systems.
Notes
1 The other goals include securing stability in nationally significant industries in the process
of reform of state-owned enterprises, including privatization that progressed in earnest
primarily with small and medium-size firms. For details, see Nolan and Jin (2002) and
Sutherland (2003). Jialing was the only firm designated for the “national teams” in the
motorcycle industry.
2 For example, firm e, which took part in the trial production of the CJ50, was a maker
specializing in carburetors for multipurpose engines used in farming. Jialing sent more than
twenty technicians to e, and implemented localization together with it (Interview with firm
e).
3 This was the earliest test equipment that China introduced for the motorcycle business, and
in 1989, Jialing was designated as one of three national-level motorcycle testing stations
(ZMGB 1995, p. 68).
4 Its performance upgrading (in output power, torque, gasoline mileage, etc) achieved with
Honda’s support was significant and its technology standards became the provisional na-
tional standards of the time.
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5 Earlier, Jialing had been unable to mass-produce engines and the CJ50 engine was pro-
duced by the members of the “complex.”
6 Interview on Jan. 21, 2005 with a former Honda staff member who participated in the
negotiations with Jialing in 1980s.
7 Three models were based on the engine and major structures of the CJ50: one with a starter
system improved for cold climates (1986), a tricycle for the handicapped (1985), and one
equipped with the appearance of the JH70 (ZMGB 1995, pp. 72–73). In addition, Jialing,
using technological materials of the GL145 and CB125S, which were imported from
Honda in the mid-1980s under the scheme of “technology and trade combination” (not the
technical cooperation scheme), started the development of the JH125 in 1987 (Yamaguchi
2005, p. 270 and ZMGB 1995, p. 74). However, the model was not mass produced and the
technology of the same line (XL125 with the CB125S engine) was officially introduced
from Honda in 1989.
8 For the formation of the complex, also see Marukawa (1995).
9 Cooperation between firms in different administrative lines, which was rare during the
period of planned economy, is called “horizontal economic association,” and its promotion
was one of the government’s policies for enterprise management reform (ZHJNBW 1991,
pp. 105–14).
10 Firms a, d, f, g, h, and j, which were interviewed for this study, were included among the
thirteen members. Of them, a, f, g, and h were among the five initial members.
11 For example, firms b, i, and k.
12 Its production capability, which was 2,500 units per year in 1980, reached 300,000 units in
1985. During this period, the “complex” contributed to a 95 percent saving in investment
and a shortening of the time to two-fifths (ZMGB 1995, p. 72). Although the method of
calculation is unknown, there does not seem to be any disagreement about the effect of
investment saving and time shortening from the formation of the “complex.”
13 Interview with Jialing and firms f, g, h, i, and k.
14 For instance, when firms a and j began to produce motorcycle parts, Jialing made payments
on their behalf to unpaid wage for the employees. The municipal government of Chongqing
asked Jialing to bail out the two firms, and supported it by giving it preferential treatment
regarding the price of steel products and electricity, which was controlled by government at
the time (Dai 1995, p. 112). This kind of bail-out function was expected in the policy
promoting “horizontal economic association” for the sake of social stability at that time
(Sutherland 2003, p. 64).
15 Suppliers other than the regular members of the “complex” were also restricted from
transactions with other makers. Interviews with b, i, and k.
16 Toward the end of the 1980s, demand stagnated due to the stringent economic control
surrounding the “Tian’anmen Incident.” However, 2 million units of sales in year 1990 was
projected at the National Motorcycle Seventh Five-Year Plan Meeting held in 1985, when
the production level was 1 million (QGSBW 2001, p. 7).
17 Interview with firms h, a, and d.
18 As its shortcomings, firm g raised the following issues: (1) unstable delivery due to its
location in a mountainous region; (2) its 1970s-type equipment becoming obsolete; and (3)
the lack of management flexibility and slow response to market requirements stemming
from its management system as a state-owned firm.
19 The purpose of the restructuring was to resolve the quality problems caused by the rapid
expansion of the production scale. Of the seventy suppliers with whom Jialing discontinued
transactions, the reason in forty cases, involving the cancellation of as many as sixty-two
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types of parts, was quality problems (Xi’nan Jingji Ribao [Southwest economic daily], Jan.
21, 1999).
20 The government invested 20 million yuan per year for R&D fund into the six firms accepted
for the first batch in 1997, to support them to become top 500 global enterprises (Zhongguo
xinxi bao [China information], Nov. 27, 1997).
21 For the characteristics and limitations of the two-stroke engine, see Note 28 of Chapter 2.
22 The description that follows regarding the relationship between Qingqi and Jinan Qingqi is
from He (2000). Groups’ utilizing their affiliated listed company as a “factory” and using it
for fund raising by controlling prices is not specific to Qingqi but seems to be widespread
throughout China at present. What Qingqi did was not an extreme case considering this
situation. For example, for the case of the Haier Group, one of the most famous manufactur-
ers in China, see He (2002).
23 In 2000, Jialing had stakes in five manufacturing firms including two manufacturers of
motorcycle parts, and Zongshen in seven manufacturers including two parts manufacturers.
24 This restriction was imposed on both firm m, a subsidiary from the first half of the 1990s,
and firm l, that has no capital affiliation.
25 The difference between a united and isolated type is a relative rather than absolute one. In
view of the degree of the maker’s leadership and suppliers’ commitment, and the cohesive-
ness that the overall system has achieved in risk sharing and competence upgrading mea-
sures, this study recognizes even Zongshen’s system as being nearer to an isolated-type one
in comparison to Japanese ones. It is particularly so when compared to that of Honda,
which can even be described as a “quasi-integrated” type, as it is one of the extreme forms
of a united type with absolute leadership from the maker and obedience from suppliers.
26 According to firm x, which supplied parts to firm h that was producing engines for Jialing,
in the beginning of the 1990s, new engine makers such as Zongshen and Lifan came with
trucks under the cover of darkness to purchase the same parts.
27 In an interview with the author, Yin said, “When I started my business, I used suppliers
developed by Jialing and Jianshe. For this, we are in their debt.”
28 For example, the top engineer of privately owned firm y was from an armaments factory,
and was assigned to localize shock absorbers for Jianshe in the 1980s, where he was
involved in its development. He moved to a privately owned firm in the 1990s, and quickly
learned how to make exactly the same parts, because the drawing developed by the arma-
ment factory, his former employer, was “in his head.” Several fellow engineers who shoul-
dered the localization project together with him are all top engineers with privately owned
parts makers at present.
29 Interview with Zuo.
30 At every interview with Zongshen, the author was told that their in-house production ratio
was 30–35 percent. However, this number included parts purchased from “close-layer”
suppliers, which should not be regarded as in-house produced parts in view of their rela-
tionship with Zongshen. Zongshen actually only manufactured a limited number of parts
in-house, along with the final processing of engine cases and the production of frames (see
Chapter 4). About 90 percent of Zongshen’s outsourcing ratio was based on the assumption
that it should be approximately the same with Lifan’s (Interview with Yin Mingshan in
1998).
31 See Note 23 of Chapter 4.
32 Part of the payment (equivalent to about 10 percent) was deposited with Zongshen, to be
used as collateral for quality problems. This was an arrangement to maintain pressure, at
the same time it improved Zongshen’s cash flow. The percentage of the deposit decreased in
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relation to the upgrading of the appraisal received by the supplier.
33 For example, firms q, s, t, v, w, and z had such experiences. According to them, the financial
support, though small in amount, became a source of personal indebtedness between the
top managers of the firms.
34 The “guarantee certificate” specified concrete terms, actions, and absolute liability such as
“when after-service is required on the spot, the supplier has to send its staff to the spot
within fifteen minutes after the notice and present a solution within four hours.”
35 For example, in the first survey, firm t, which had introduced testing equipment along with
Zongshen gave its impression, saying, “The more we produce, the more quality problems
we face.” Until then, the firm had placed top priority on cost, but the introduction of the
testing equipment revealed points to be improved, and it keenly realized that “quality
upgrading has no end.” It mentioned that complying with the quality demands of the maker
was the major way to develop its own firm.
36 At that time, Zuo said to the author, “The entire group shares the feeling that if the dragon
head [Zongshen, which led the whole group] goes down, so does the rest.” In fact, however,
the suppliers thought otherwise.
37 According to Sako (1992), in transactions in Japan, an “open commitment” based on
“goodwill trust” is often observed, in which a party presumes that if requested, the greatest
efforts would be made by the trading partner to improve the performance of both parties
irrespective of the level or category formally requested (Sako 1992, p. 38).
